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SYMPOSIUM ON THE FUTURE
OF THE JUVENILE COURT
FOREWORD-THE DEBATE OVER THE
FUTURE OF JUVENILE COURTS:
CAN WE REACH CONSENSUS?
THOMAS F. GERAGHTY & STEVEN A. DRIZIN*"
I. INTRODUCTION
In 1999 we will observe the centennial of the first juvenile
court. It was founded in Chicago, Illinois by a group of reform-
ers in reaction to the deprivation and abuse suffered by children
in the adult criminal justice system. These reformers believed
. Professor of Law, Northwestern University School of Law; Director, Northwestern
University Legal Clinic.
.. Clinical Faculty, Northwestern University Legal Clinic, Children & FamilyJustice
Center.
'The first juvenile court was established in 1899 by reformers who included Jane
Addams, Lucy Flower, and Clarence Darrow. See generally David S. Tanenhaus, Polic-
ing the Child: Juvenile Justice in Chicago, 1870-1925 (1997) (unpublished Ph.D. dis-
sertation, University of Chicago) (on file with author); Frank Kopecky, Introduction to
JuvenileJustice, in IuNoISJuVEN E LAW & PRACTICE 1-5 (1997); JoAN GrrrENs, PoOR
RELATIONS, THE CHILDREN OF ThE STATE IN ILLINOIS, 1818-1990, 90-158 (1994); ROBERT
M. MENNEL, THoRNs & THISTLEs: JUvENILE DELINQUENTS IN THE UNITED STATES, 1825-
1940, 124-57 (1973). But see Sanford J. Fox, A Contribution to the History of the
American Juvenile Court to 1980 (Sept. 28, 1997) (unpublished manuscript, pre-
sented at the Janiculum Project Conference: Reviewing the Past and Looking Toward
the Future of the Juvenile Court) (on file with authors) (acknowledging that Illinois
reformers took the lead in attempting to reform corrections but identifying Judge
Benjamin Lindsey of Denver, Colorado as the creator of the juvenile judge as a
"therapeutic agent").
The first calls for the establishment of a juvenile court were based on concerns
about the care of children facing and found guilty of criminal charges. The Juvenile
Court Law of the State of Illinois was the outcome of many years of effort on the part
of men and women interested in child care. Prior to its enactment in July, 1899, pro-
cedure with juvenile and adult offenders was practically identical. Children, no mat-
ter how young, were habitually taken to police court. If unable to secure bail, they
were locked in cells, and, as penalty, or in default of payment of fine, were sent to the
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that children and adolescents were fundamentally different
from adults, and that non-penal environments were necessary
for most delinquent children in order to steer them to produc-
tive and crime-free lives. The founders of the Illinois Juvenile
Court were more concerned about the nature of the services
provided to delinquent, neglected, and abused children than
they were about the new juvenile court's procedural fairness.
The burgeoning influence of the social sciences, which gave
hope that children's lives could be changed for the better
through enlightened social service interventions, influenced
these reformers and motivated them to develop a separate sys-
tem for treating adolescent offenders.3 Within a few years, the
juvenile court movement spread throughout the country, and
separate juvenile court systems were established in every state.4
As the juvenile court approaches its 100th birthday, how-
ever, its future is less secure than at any point in its history. Re-
cent increases in juvenile violent crime,5 including historic
House of Corrections along with criminals of every sort and age. Even if a thoughtful
judge or a political friend could help free a child, the child was allowed to go back
into the same environment that had caused his delinquency, without permanent help
or supervision. CITIZENS' INvEsTGATING CoMM., ILL., REPORT OF A COMMrTEE
APPOINTED UNDER RESOLUTION OF THE BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS OF COOK COUNTY 9
(1912).
2 AsJoan Gittens observes:
Children unable to pay fines were incarcerated, working off their fines at the rate
of fifty cents a day. Those who could not raise bail were held pending trial. In
the year 1898, there were 575 children in the Cook County Jail; in the twenty
months from March 1, 1897 to November 1, 1898, 1,983 boys passed through the
Chicago House of Corrections. Twenty-five percent of the children in jail that
year were committed for truancy. The Chicago Women's Club, in company with
other child welfare reformers, had succeeded in persuading the board of educa-
tion to establish the John Worthy School at the Chicago House of Correction in
1897 so that the children had some opportunity for schooling; but there were
still no effective restraints on their association with adults when they were re-
turned to their cells at night.
GITENS, supra note 1, at 103.
3 Id. at 127-31.
' By 1909, ten states and the District of Columbia had established juvenile courts.
By 1925, all but Maine and Wyoming had juvenile courts. Wyoming was the last state
to create ajuvenile court (1945). SeeMENNEL, supra note 1, at 132.
' The Department of Justice has calculated that from 1965-1992 violent crime
among juveniles increased from an average of 65.1 offenses to 197.6 offenses per
100,000 juveniles. See UNIFORM CRIME REPORTING PROGRAM, FEDERAL BuREAu OF
INVESTIGATION, AGE-SPECIFIC .RATES & RACE-SPECIFIC ARREST RATES FOR SELECTED
OFFENSES, 1965-1992, 157 (1993).
It is important to keep this increase in perspective. The overwhelming majority of
arrests for juvenile crime are for nonviolent offenses. In 1994, only 6 out of every 100
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increases in juvenile homicides, have led politicians to "reform"
the court by passing laws which minimize the court's jurisdic-
don, including a new wave of laws that transfer more juveniles,
at younger ages, into the adult criminal court system.7 In most
cases, these youthful offenders, once transferred, are treated no
differently from adults.8 In fact, "reforms" in the sentencing of
adult offenders, like mandatory minimum sentencing and
"truth-in-sentencing," have made it increasingly common for
youthful offenders to receive long incarcerative sentences in
adult correctional facilities.9 In this rush to punish and inca-
pacitate youthful offenders, policy makers have given less and
less weight to the developmental perspective that led to the
creation of separate courts and treatment interventions for ju-
veniles and adults.10
juvenile arrests were for violent crimes. OFFICE OF JUVENILE JUST. & DELINQUENCY
PREVENTION, JUVENILE OFFENDERS & VIGTIMs: 1996 UPDATE ON VIOLENCE 10 (1996)
[hereinafter UPDATE ON VIOLENCE]. Moreover, the majority of violent crime arrests
(56%) were for assault, a broad category which often involves the threat of harm
rather than actual harm and encompasses shouting matches and schoolyard fights.
Id. Finally, since reaching its peak in 1994, arrests of teenagers for violent crimes
have dropped significantly in the past two years. In 1995, FBI data showed a 2.9% de-
crease in juvenile violent crime arrests. Id. In 1996, according to the FBI,juvenile ar-
rests for violent crime dropped another 9.2%. See Reno Hails Drop in Teens Arrested for
Violent Crimes, CI. TRIB., Oct. 3, 1997, at 3.
' The same Department of Justice survey calculated that juvenile homicides in-
creased over the same period from 1.4 offenses to 5.0 offenses per 100,000 juveniles.
UPDATE ON VIOLENCE, supra note 5, at 10. The recent increases in juvenile homicides
are linked directly to the availability of firearms to juveniles. More than half of the
country's juvenile homicide arrests are concentrated in just six states and just four
cities-Los Angeles, New York, Chicago, and Detroit-account for nearly a third of
the juvenile homicide arrests. VINCENT SHIRALDI & ERIC LOTKE, AN ANALYSIS OF
JUVENImE HOMICIDES: WHERE THEY OCCUR AND THE EFFECTIVENESS OF ADULT COURT
INTERVENTION 1 (1996). Thejuvenile homicide rate has also dropped by 22.8% since
reaching its peak in 1993. See Fox Butterfield, WithJuvenile Courts in Chaos, Critics Pro-
pose Their Demise, N.Y. TIMEs,July 21, 1997, atAl.
7 See, e.g., Barry C. Feld, Criminalizing the American Juvenile Court, 17 CRIME & JUST.
197 (1993) [hereinafter Feld, Criminalizing theJuvenile Court]; Barry C. Feld, The Trans-
formation of the Juvenile Court, 75 MINN. L. REv. 691 (1991) [hereinafter Feld, Transfor-
mation of the Juvenile Court].
8 See PATRICIA TORBET ET AL., STATE RESPONSES TO SERIOUS & VIOLENT JUVENILE
CRIME xv (1996) (executive summary).
' See generally Karen Lujen, Culpability and Sentencing Under Mandatory Minimums
and the Federal Sentencing Guidelines: The Punishment No Longer Fits the Criminal, 10
NOTRE DAMEJ.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 389 (1996).
0 However, it should be noted that from the beginning, juveniles in Illinois
charged with serious crimes were subjected to both juvenile and adult court jurisdic-
tions. Concurrentjurisdiction remained the fact until 1907. On June 4, 1907, the Il-
linois legislature amended the then-existing Juvenile Court Act (which was listed in
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The four articles in this issue of the Journal of Criminal Law
and Criminology revisit the court's roots in developmental psy-
chology, debate the extent to which adolescents differ from
adults, and probe whether those differences continue to vali-
date the underlying justification for the juvenile court. Al-
though the authors have different visions of the future of
juvenile justice, all four reaffirm the basic notion that most ju-
veniles, because of their developmental differences, are less re-
sponsible for their actions than adults and should be punished
differently from adults who commit the same criminal acts.
This common sense notion-which should be obvious to any-
one who has teenage children or can remember her own ado-
lescence-provides the most compelling defense for
maintaining separate justice systems for juveniles and adults.
The four articles in this Symposium present differing pro-
posals about how our society should deal with children who
commit crimes. The articles capture the range of questions and
alternatives that scholars, practitioners, and policy makers are
the "Charities" statutory chapter instead of the "Courts" chapter) to include the fol-
lowing provision:
The court may in its discretion in any case of a delinquent child permit such
child to be proceeded against in accordance with the laws that may be in force in
this State governing the commission of crimes or violations of city, village, or
town ordinance. In such case the petition filed under this Act shall be dismissed.
1907 Ill. Laws § 9a, 70-72.
While this provision allowed for discretionary transfers to criminal court, it was not
until July 31, 1967 that this more explicit provision (now placed in the "Courts" chap-
ter of Illinois law) was adopted:
If a petition alleges commission by a minor 13 years of age or over of an act
which constitutes a crime under the laws of this State, the State's Attorney shall
determine the court in which that minor is to be prosecuted; however, if the Ju-
venile CourtJudge objects to the removal of a case from the jurisdiction of the
Juvenile Court, the matter shall be referred to the chief judge of the circuit for
decision and disposition.
ILL. Com'. STAT. 37/702-7(3) (West 1972).
Subsequent legislation formalized the transfer process, adding hearings and fac-
tors to assist judicial decision-making. Illinois amended the procedure in 1973 judi-
cial transfer); 1982 (automatic transfer to criminal court for certain crimes); 1985
(automatic transfer for certain crimes on school grounds); 1990 (automatic transfer
for gang-related felonies or drug offenses in public housing); 1991 (automatic trans-
fer for escape or bond violations); and 1995 (presumptive transfer, where after a find-
ing of probable cause the burden shifts to the minor to rebut presumption for
transfer). See Terence M. Madsen, Transfer ofJurisdiction, in ILUNOISJUVENUI LAW &
PRAcTncE, supra note 1, at 3-18 to 3-19.
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now considering when mapping the future of juvenile justice."
To what extent should we distinguish between the moral and
criminal responsibility of children and adults? How should
those differences play out in our juvenile and criminal justice
systems? Should the juvenile court's delinquency jurisdiction be
abolished because of its inability to achieve justice and because
of the unfairness inherent in the court's judicial license to treat
one child differently from another? Should the juvenile court
be abolished because of the failure of its treatment and penal
programs? Or, should the existing juvenile justice model be re-
tained precisely because it, as opposed to the more formal
criminal court, retains the flexibility to be responsive to the spe-
cial developmental needs of children? These questions are at
the heart of the debate over the future of the juvenile court.
The authors of the four articles featured in this Symposium at-
tempt to answer these questions.
" The on-going debate about the future ofjuvenile justice is robust. Compare, e.g.,
Feld, Criminalizing the American Juvenile Court, supra note 7 (after legislative, judicial,
and administrative reforms, the juvenile court now converges procedurally and sub-
stantively with the adult criminal court), andJanet E. Ainsworth, Re-Imagining Child-
hood and Reconstructuring the Legal Order: The Case for Abolishing the Juvenile Court, 69
N.C. L. REV. 1083 (1991) (contemporary society no longer views juveniles as the
original founders of the juvenile court did, and juveniles would benefit from the pro-
cedural safeguards in adult criminal court), and Katherine H. Federle, The Abolition of
the Juvenile Court: A Proposal for the Preservation of Children's Legal Rights, 16 J. CONTFM.
L. 23 (1990) (because of the schizophrenia of the juvenile court system, abolishing
the juvenile court will promote juvenile rights), andJanet E. Ainsworth, Youth Justice
in a Unified Court: Response to the Critics ofJuvenile Court Abolition, 36 B.C. L. REv. 927
(1995) (the assumptions behind the two-tiered juvenile and criminal court system
engender many of the serious shortcomings of the juvenile court and exacerbate
problems with the criminal court), with Irene Merker Rosenberg, Leaving Bad Enough
Alone: A Response to the Juvenile Court Abolitionists, 1993 WIs. L. REv. 163 (benefits of the
flawed juvenile court nevertheless outweigh procedural shortcomings because the
criminal court cannot adequately protect the immaturity and vulnerability of minors),
and Gary B. Melton, Taking Gault Seriously: Toward a New Juvenile Court, 68 NEB. L.
REv. 146 (1989) (juvenile court should be given more procedural protections than
criminal court).
Perhaps the staunchest opponents of treating juveniles as adults are juvenile de-
fense attorneys. They argue that the issue cannot be looked at in the abstract: anyone
who examines actual children in actual cases will conclude that even treating juve-
niles who commit serious felonies as adults is not a viable solution. See, e.g., Wendy
Anton Fitzgerald, Stories of Child Outlaws: On Child Heroism and Adult Power In Juvenile
Justice, 1996 WIs. L. REv. 495; Abbe Smith, They Dream of Growing Older: On Kids And
Crime, 36 B.C. L. REv. 953 (1995); Catherine R. Guttman, Listen To The Children: The
Decision To Transfer Juveniles To Adult Court, 30 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 507 (1995);
Francine T. Sherman, Thoughts On A Contextual View Of Juvenile Justice Reform Drawn
From Narratives Of Youth, 68 TEMP. L. REV. 1837 (1995).
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II. THE ARTICLES
Professor Stephen Morse would rest reform of the juvenile
justice and criminal justice systems on the answer to one ques-
tion: to what extent should young people be held responsible
for their criminal activity? Morse argues that we should not de-
lude ourselves-a "robust" theory of responsibility would result
in most juveniles (mid-to-late adolescents) being held fully re-
sponsible for their actions. 2 He argues that research demon-
strates that it is often difficult to distinguish between the moral
responsibility of children and young adults. If this is true, why
should the responsibility of a juvenile be less than that of a psy-
chologically similarly situated young adult? Moreover, youth
susceptibility to peer pressure does not justify differential alloca-
tion of responsibility.
Although juveniles may lack "the capacity for empathy.., a
component of normative competence,"13 many adults may also
lack this characteristic. Should we treat all persons who lack
empathy the same, the result being that some adults would be
the beneficiaries of an "empathy" excuse? According to Morse,
the youth factor of poor judgment is not a -moral excuse, but
should be taken into account in more flexible sentencing
schemes which recognize an optimum degree of responsibility
based upon developmental variables and a young person's ame-
nability to treatment.14 However, since classification of offend-
ers is difficult, "and we are seldom sure about what works
specifically for whom the various therapeutic interventions that
might be tried... [t]he disposition of partially responsible ado-
lescents thus presents a gargantuan dilemma."15 The solution?
"Perhaps the best we can do is some legislatively mandated re-
duction in punishment for all partially responsible adoles-
cents,"06 a proposal that' is mirrored in Professor Feld's
suggestion that a "youth discount"'17 be provided to the children
12 StephenJ. Morse, Immaturity and Irresponsibility, 88J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 15,
17, 48, 47, 66 (1997).
Id. at 60.
'4 id. at 61-66.
"Id. at 65.
"Id. at 66.
7 Barry C. Feld, Abolish the Juvenile Court: Youthfulness, Criminal Responsibility, and
Sentencing Policy, 88J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 68, 70, 115-31 (1997).
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who, under his proposal, would no longer be tried in juvenile
court.
The value of Professor Morse's work is that it forces us to
examine a basic premise of juvenile court: that children are
"morally" different from adults in their decision making capa-
bilities. Having discussed the issue, and finding that there are
differences, but not perhaps as pronounced as defenders of ju-
venile courts might like us to believe, Professor Morse acknowl-
edges that creating sensible legislative responses to the dilemma
he identifies "will not be a simple task.
1 8
Professor Barry Feld's proposal is much more explicit and
concrete. He renews his previous call for abolition of the juve-
nile court19 and argues for the recognition of youthfulness as a
mitigating factor in sentencing youthful offenders in criminal
court.20  Abolition of the juvenile court is necessary because
changes in the court's jurisdiction, purpose, and procedures
since its inception have transformed the court from its "original
model as a social service agency into a deficient second-rate
criminal court that provides people with neither positive treat-
ment nor criminal procedural justice.."21 According to Feld, the
juvenile court's problems cannot be remedied by simply increas-
ing resources for rehabilitation or refining treatment tech-
niques. The "very idea" of a court that attempts to combine
criminal social control with social welfare is doomed to fail.22
Feld's solution is an integrated criminal court that adopts a
separate sentencing policy-a "youth discount"-for younger
offenders.2 Feld acknowledges developmental differences be-
tween most juveniles and most adults: juveniles are more likely,
because of their age, grandiosity, and impulsivity, to be greater
risk-takers than adults. They have little ability to think about the
long-term consequences of their actions and are highly suscep-
'8 Morse, supra note 12, at 67.
'9 See, e.g., Feld, Transformation of the Juvenile Court, supra note 7, at 722-25; Barry C.
Feld, The Juvenile Court Meets the Principle of Offense: Punishment, Treatment, and the Dif-
ference It Makes, 68 B.U. L. REv. 821, 909-15 (1988); Barry C. Feld, Ciminalizingjuvenile
Justice: Rules of Procedure for the Juvenile Cour 69 MINN. L. REv. 141, 274 (1984); Barry
C. Feld, Juvenile Court Legislative Reform and the Serious Youth Offender: Dismantling the
"Rehabilitative Ideal, -65 MINN. L. REv. 167, 242 (1980).
" Feld, supra note 17, at 95-97.
21 Id. at 90.
Id. at 132.
"Id at 70, 115-31.
1997]
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tible to negative peer influences.2 4 These differences justify
more lenient sentences for juveniles. The "binary distinction
between infant and adult that provides for states' legal age of
majority and the jurisprudential foundation of the juvenile
court ignores the reality that adolescents develop along a con-
tinuum .... "2 A single criminal court with a "youth discount"
would be "more responsive to the needs of youth than the cur-
rent version of the juvenile court."26 Moreover, an integrated
criminal court would provide youthful offenders with substan-
tive protections "comparable to those afforded by juvenile
courts, assure greater procedural regularity in the determina-
tion of guilt, and avoid the disjunctions caused by maintaining
two duplicative and inconsistent criminal justice systems."
27
Feld also makes the constructive suggestion that "[s]tates
should maintain separate age-segregated youth correctional fa-
cilities to protect both younger offenders and older inmates."28
The facilities housing youth should "provide them with re-
sources for self-improvement on a voluntary basis . . . ."2 The
state has an obligation to provide juveniles with these resources
not because juveniles have a "right to treatment" or because
such services will necessarily reduce recidivism, but because
most juveniles will return to society one day. Failure to provide
them with opportunities for growth while they are incarcerated
will guarantee "greater long-term human, criminal, and correc-
tional costs."
30
There are, however, dangers inherent in Feld's approach.
As Feld states,
[a] lthough abolition of the juvenile court, enhanced procedural protec-
tions, and a "youth discount" constitute essential components of a youth
sentencing policy package, nothing can prevent legislators from selec-
tively choosing only those elements that serve their "get tough" agenda,
even though doing so unravels the threads that make coherent a pro-
posal for an integrated court. 31
24 See Feld, supra note 17, at 33; Morse, supra note 12, at 30; Elizabeth Cauffman &
Laurence Steinberg, The Cognitive and Affective Influences on Adolescent Decision-Making,
68 TEMP. L. REV. 1763, 1787 (1995).
' Feld, supra note 17, at 115.
26 Id. at 69.
27Id.
28 Id. at 130.
2'd. at 131.
3 Id.
" Id. at 133 (citation omitted).
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The same can be said for Feld's proposal for requiring states to
provide youthful offenders with educational, social services, and
job training while incarcerated.3 2 Legislators have been more
than eager to cut back such services in adult correctional facili-
ties. 3
Professors Elizabeth Scott and Thomas Grisso evaluate the
differences between adults and delinquent youth and conclude
that there are substantial differences between very young juve-
niles and adults in "moral, cognitive, and social development."34
However, they also conclude that by mid-adolescence the differ-
ences between adolescent and adult decision making are more
subtle. "A categorical presumption of adolescent nonresponsi-
bility, such as that which was endorsed by the traditional juve-
nile justice system, is hard to defend on the grounds of
immaturity alone."3 Their developmental evidence "supports
the argument of the post-Gault reformers of the 1970s and
1980s that a presumptive diminished responsibility standard be
applied to juveniles."36 For Scott and Grisso, unlike Feld, this
presumptive diminished responsibility is best applied in juvenile
court systems. The criminal justice system cannot respond to
this developmental reality: "[t]he ability or inclination of the
criminal justice system to tailor its response to juvenile crime so
as to utilize the lessons of developmental psychology is question-
able. The evidence suggests that political pressure functions as
a one-way ratchet, in the direction of ever stiffer penalties."37
Scott and Grisso also question the assumption accepted by
Professors Morse and Feld, that most juvenile delinquents, even
by mid-adolescence, are as cognitively competent as adults to
make decisions. According to Scott and Grisso, the studies sup-
porting the claim that the cognitive decision-making abilities of
adolescents and adults are comparable involved mostly non-
delinquent youths from middle class backgrounds who were of
above-average intelligence.ss Scott and Grisso question the ap-
-1 See id. at 131.
See generally Melvin Gutterman, The Contours of Eighth Amendment Prison Jurispru-
dence: Conditions of Confinement 48 SMU L. REV. 373 (1995).
' Elizabeth S. Scott & Thomas Grisso, The Evolution of Adolescence: A Developmental
Perspective on Juvenile Justice Reform, 88J. CRIM. L. & CRMNOLOG 137, 174 (1997).
35Id.
6Id. at 17 4-7 5 .
3 7 Id. at 189.
" Id. at 159-60, 160 n.86 (citing studies).
19971
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plicability of these studies to children involved in the juvenile
justice system, many of whom have learning disabilities, and
emotional problems that may delay their capacity for under-
standing. 9
Not only would it be a mistake to overestimate the cognitive
competence of many delinquent youths, but Scott and Grisso
also warn that it is a mistake to underestimate the effects of de-
velopmental factors on the ability of juveniles to participate
meaningfully in decision making concerning their court cases.
Citing recent research, Scott and Grisso note that "delinquent
adolescents are at risk of becoming less competent participants
in their defense than are adults, and that this risk is especially
great for youths under the age of fourteen." ° Studies of "aver-
age" fourteen to seventeen-year-olds have shown no significant
differences between adolescents and adults in their basic under-
standing of trial-related matters, but again these studies may not
be applicable to delinquent youths.41  Other studies-which
demonstrate that adolescents with lower intelligence scores,
learning disabilities, and other mental disorders, are less likely
to understand the legal process-suggest that the problem of
incompetence among juvenile delinquents may be widespread.
Although the research is not precise enough to draw a bright
line about the age of criminal adjudication, Scott and Grisso
suggest that until age fifteen, the developmental differences be-
tween youths and adults are sufficient to raise substantial issues
about the procedural fairness of trying these youngsters in adult
court.45
" Id. at 157-60.40 Id. at 169 (citing Thomas Grisso, The Competence of Adolescents as Trial Defendants,
PSYCH., PUB. POL & L. (forthcoming 1998)).41 id.
42 Id. (citing studies).
43 Id. at 157-60, 168-69. Scott and Grisso note that "[t]he behavioral traits and in-
experience that in general characterize youthful offenders" should be taken into ac-
count in sentencing "immature" adult offenders more leniently. Id. at 175. Unlike
Morse, however, Scott and Grisso do believe that juveniles, as a class, should be held
less responsible and punished less severely than similarly-situated adults. With adults,
reduced punishment reflects an "individual deficiency, a failure to attain an adult
level of maturity and experience." Id. at 176. Consequently, with minors, the behav-
ioral differences are typical of a developmental stage shared by other minors of the
same age. Id. Thus, a categorical response to adolescents as a group-a presumption
of diminished responsibility-is appropriate. Id.
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Writing as a practitioner who represents children charged
with serious crimes in juvenile and in criminal court, Professor
Thomas Geraghty draws upon his experience of representing
children, as well as the same rich interdisciplinary work relied
upon by Morse, Feld, and Scott and Grisso to suggest a way of
reconceptualizing and reinvigorating juvenile courts.4 Profes-
sor Geraghty argues that the challenges to the legitimacy of ju-
venile courts posed by Morse and Feld must be taken seriously
and constructively because they focus the attention of juvenile
court "preservationists" on the difficult and sustained work that
must be done if a separate juvenile court system is to survive.4
The challenges are constructive because they are based upon
valid criticisms of past and present assumptions about the na-
ture of the children who appear in juvenile court. The chal-
lenges are fair because juvenile courts have historically failed to
provide procedural protection, effective interventions and
treatments, and measured and consistent imposition of moral
responsibility.46 Acknowledging these failures, Professor Ger-
aghty argues that the model of a specialized court for delin-
quent children and specialized treatment and rehabilitation
interventions for children holds more potential for doing justice
to children and protecting society than does a unified juve-
nile/criminal justice system 47
III. CONCLUSION
The articles in this Symposium place in sharp focus impor-
tant views on the future of juvenile justice. Morse and Feld
question the continuing normative viability of the concept of a
separate juvenile court: Morse, because of the juvenile court's
failure to articulate a "robust" theory of responsibility; and Feld,
because of the vagueness of standards (i.e., "amenability to
treatment") that distinguish among those who should be subject
to the juvenile court's jurisdiction and the juvenile court's lack
of procedural protections for children. Scott and Grisso argue
for a more sophisticated juvenile court, one that would continue
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to learn from the lessons of developmental psychology and
would shape its jurisdiction and dispositions accordingly.
Even if juvenile courts remain conceptualized as they are,
the approaches to juvenile justice described in these articles
present significant tensions which must be resolved. For exam-
ple, implementation of Professor Morse's theories of moral re-
sponsibility would result in more children being tried as adults.
Professor Feld's recommendations would require dismantling
the juvenile court and revolutionizing the way that the adult
criminal court system thinks about children. Professors Scott
and Grisso argue for a re-vitalization of juvenile courts based
upon a deeper understanding of the psychological and social
forces which bring children into court. Professor Geraghty's
view is that we should return to a juvenile justice system in
which nearly all children are tried in juvenile court.
How should we chose between these competing models of
justice for young offenders? How should our legislators, judges,
prosecutors, defense lawyers, probation officers, social workers,
psychologists, and psychiatrists respond as they chart the future
course ofjustice for children?
The work of Morse, Feld, Scott and Grisso, and Geraghty
contain ideas that could be utilized together to structure and to
maintain ajust court system for children. Morse's theory of re-
sponsibility reminds us that juveniles should be held morally ac-
countable for their criminal behavior. In order for the juvenile
court to survive into the next century, advocates for the juvenile
court system must address the public's perception that the court
has too often sought to excuse delinquency on account of the
offender's youthfulness. Feld's powerful critique of the juvenile
court instructs us to be vigilant about children's due process
rights and to force the juvenile court, wherever possible, to live
up to its rehabilitative mission. The current lack of due process,
including in most states the lack of a right to ajury trial, and in
many instances, the lack of counsel,48 coupled with the lack of
resources aimed at rehabilitating offenders, continues to mean,
almost thirty years after Gault, that children in juvenile court of-
ten receive the "worst of both worlds." Scott and Grisso tell us
that new and evolving research in developmental psychology,
See, e.g., A CALL FORJUSTICE: AN ASSESSMENT OF AccEss TO COUNSEL AND QUALIY
OF REPRESENTATION IN DEUNQUENCYPROCEEDINGS (Patricia Puritz ed., 1995).
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coupled with research concerning promising interventions for
youthful offenders, justifies the continuing need for separate
courts for children and adolescents.
Finally, Geraghty argues that what is needed is a new, rein-
vigorated juvenile court, that is sensitive to the developmental
needs of juveniles in each case, flexible enough to respond to
new discoveries in social science research, and willing to invest
in and experiment with the promising new interventions for of-
fenders. To respond to Professor Feld's concerns, the new ju-
venile court must provide procedural protections, including the
right to a jury trial in many cases, and must be staffed by the
most experienced and learned prosecutors, defense attorneys,
and judges. State-of-the-art interventions must also be created
and maintained.49
Scott and Grisso also caution us that while due process
rights for children and adolescents are important, transferring
offenders to adult court will not ensure them procedural due
process. Because many youthful offenders may be incompetent
due to their cognitive disabilities and developmental limitations,
they may not be able to fully participate in their defense and
take advantage of the right to a jury trial and other enhanced
due process rights afforded them in criminal court.
When read together, these articles provide an outline for
the juvenile court for the twenty-first century. A juvenile court
that holds youthful offenders accountable, in a system that en-
sures fair and just adjudications by providing juveniles with due
process-especially a meaningful right to counsel-in an envi-
ronment that is sensitive to their developmental and cognitive
limitations, and that lives up to the promise of the founders to
attempt to rehabilitate offenders, should be a vital community
resource. The message from all four articles to those who will
shape the juvenile court of the future is to remember always that
children and adolescents are developmentally different from
adults, that these differences often lessen ajuvenile's culpability,
and that it should be possible to design a system that balances
the needs of children with society's need to impose responsibil-
ity and protect itself.
'9 For a description of new and revitalized approaches to providing services to at-
risk youth, see Paul Holland & Wallace J. Mlyniec, Whatever Happened to the Right to
Treatment?: The Modern Questfor a Historical Promise, 68 TEMP. L. REV. 1791 (1995).
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